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Put your message in a modem 




At the risk of stating the obvious, electronic gadgets and digital 
media are ubiquitous in our modern world.  Perhaps it seems that 
both the animate and inanimate objects around us have been 
reduced to digitized ones and zeros: from e-books to movies, 
spreadsheets to GPSs, music to family photos, dating to job-seeking, 
diaries to recipes, auctions to education, and stock-trading to 
holiday cards.  People lumber around halls and sidewalks, staring at 
digital devices, texting, checking the weather, listening to music, 
seemingly oblivious to the physical world around them.  In 2007, it 
was reported that the world created more electronic documents in 
the year prior than the documents in all the years combined since 
Gutenberg invented the printing press.2  By then, at least ninety-
three percent of all new information was created digitally,3 and, of 
all electronically stored information (“ESI”), at least thirty percent 
would never be printed out.4  In May 2011, the online merchant 
Amazon.com announced that its sales of electronic books overtook 
sales of printed books.5  Meanwhile, the President has decreed the 
growing number of cyber security threats is “one of the most 
serious economic and national security challenges we face as a 
nation.”6  The volume of data breaches, mostly consisting of 
hacking and malware, is at the highest level ever, according to a 
 
 1. RUSH, Virtuality, on TEST FOR ECHO (Atlantic Records 1996). 
 2. William E. Mooz, Jr., Technology Tips for Reducing EDD Review Costs, 24 
LEGAL TECH NEWSL., no.12, Mar. 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://www 
.catalystsecure.com/images/crs/articles/Technology_Tips_0307.pdf (noting the 
great increase in data as a result of new technologies and its effect on litigation). 
 3. James Larue et al., Trails from the Aether: Cyber-Evidence, in 54.1 STATE BAR 
OF TEXAS 33RD ANNUAL ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE 1, 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/6367/110331_01.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Claire Cain Miller & Julie Bosman, E-Books Outsell Print Books at Amazon, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/technology 
/20amazon.html. 
 6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our 
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2011 joint report by Verizon and the U.S. Secret Service.7  As one 
commentator wryly observed, “Hardly a month has gone by this 
year without a multinational company such as Google Inc. . . . , 
EMC Corp. or Sony Corp. . . . disclosing it’s been hacked by cyber 
intruders who infiltrated networks or stole customer information.”8  
Likewise, hardly a week goes by without a prominent figure 
becoming embroiled in a scandal because of a social media 
misstep.9 
Societal trends, such as the foregoing, invariably manifest 
themselves in legal controversies,10 and, as a consequence thereof, 
new fields of expertise such as “ethical hacking” and cloud 
forensics11 are emerging.  These trends have led to “a huge 
demand” for highly educated specialists in the discipline of digital 
forensics.12  Consequently, lawyers have been—in both litigation 
support and law practice management—increasingly encountering 
or relying upon digital forensics experts.13  And, although 
education in this emerging discipline has focused largely on its 
technical aspects,14 there are significant legal and ethical challenges 
 
 7. Wade Baker et al., 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON, 6 
(2011), http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach 
-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf. 
 8. Michael Riley et al., Cyber Cops Stymied by Anonymity in Tracking Google, Sony 
Hacks, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2011-06-07/google-sony-nintendo-hacker-anonymity-stymies-arrests-by-u-s-cyber-
cops.html. 
 9. See, e.g., Christian Boone, Embarassing Online Exchanges Becoming Political 
Scandal Du Jour, AJC, June 6, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/embarrassing-online-
exchanges-becoming-969042.html. 
 10. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law as 
a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 BYU L. REV. 89 (1975) (positing that the 
law is simultaneously a means of social control, a means of facilitating human 
interaction, and the realization of reciprocal expectancies). 
 11. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 
1121-0329, SOLICITATION: ELECTRONIC CRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE RECOVERY 
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl000957.pdf 
(“NIJ seeks proposals for research and technology development leading to the 
introduction into practice of forensic tools that can overcome the challenges of 
the Cloud computing environment.”); Joe McKendrick, Cloud Forensics: New Practice 
Emerges Out of Necessity, SMARTPLANET (Jan. 31., 2011, 9:39 AM),  
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/cloud-forensics-new-practice-
emerges-out-of-necessity/13338. 
 12. BILL NELSON ET AL., GUIDE TO COMPUTER FORENSICS AND INVESTIGATIONS 
508 (4th ed. 2010). 
 13. Jerry Wegman, Computer Forensics: Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Cases, 
8 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 1, 2 (2005) (explaining the evolution of digital 
forensic experts and the legal challenges they face). 
 14. Gilbert Whittemore, Report to the House of Delegates, 2008 AM. BAR ASS’N 
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confronting investigators, for which they are ill prepared.15 
This Comment is divided into four parts: the first section, 
following this introduction, is an overview of ethical rules and 
obligations governing attorneys and investigators in digital 
forensics investigations.  This includes some possible ethical pitfalls 
in supervising investigators, and the investigator’s obligations 
relating to the work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, and 
information security.  The second section urges that, 
notwithstanding the challenges and dangers discussed in the first 
section, the use of digital forensics examiners may be essential to 
prevailing in a case, or mitigating the harm incurred by the lawyer 
and client.  Finally, the third section introduces and briefly analyzes 
special considerations in digital forensic investigations relating to 
cloud computing and social media. 
The American Academy of Forensic Sciences classifies digital 
forensics as a forensic science.  For the purposes of this Comment, 
digital forensics is defined as: 
 The use of scientifically derived and proven methods 
toward the preservation, collection, validation, 
identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and 
presentation of digital evidence derived from digital 
sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the 
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping 
to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive 
to planned operations.16 
 
SEC. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, available at 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/aba_report_and_resolutio
n.pdf (“Numerous professional certifications are available to computer forensic 
and network testing professionals that are based on rigorous curricula and 
competency examinations.”). 
 15. Wegman, supra note 13, at 2. 
 16. Gary Palmer, A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research, DFRWS 16 (Nov. 6, 
2001), http://www.dfrws.org/2001/dfrws-rm-final.pdf; see also THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 
2010), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content 
/miscFiles/glossary2010.pdf.  For forensics: 
The scientific examination and analysis of data held on, or retrieved from, ESI in 
such a way that the information can be used as evidence in a court of law.  It may 
include the secure collection of computer data; the examination of suspect data to 
determine details such as origin and content; the presentation of computer based 
information to courts of law; and the application of a country’s laws to computer 
practice.  Forensics may involve recreating “deleted” or missing files from hard 
drives, validating dates and logged in authors/editors of documents, and certifying 
key elements of documents and/or hardware for legal purposes. 
Id. at 23. 
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The word “forensic” means “[u]sed in or suitable to courts of 
law.”17  So, it might seem natural that digital forensics practitioners 
and lawyers have occasion to work closely together.  Yet, although 
digital forensics “is by no means a new field of endeavor,”18 it is “a 
relatively new discipline to the courts and many of the existing laws 
used to prosecute computer-related crimes, legal precedents, and 
practices related to computer forensics are in a state of flux.”19 
To appreciate the benefits of pairing an astute lawyer with a 
digital forensics examiner who has a robust legal background, 
consider that benign ingredients exist within ordinary kitchen 
cupboards and pantries, which, when mixed together with care, 
create appetizing confections or healing concoctions.  To 
appreciate the risks of an alternative arrangement, recall that 
baking soda mixed with vinegar results in a frothy mess.  
Accordingly, the prudent attorney must select a digital forensics 
expert carefully, and maintain strict adherence to both separation 
of duties and supervisory capacity. 
II. ETHICS IN DIGITAL FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS 
A. Ethical Rules Governing Digital Forensics Investigations 
In the United States, there are no digital forensics licensing 
bodies,20 although a few states require digital forensics examiners to 
be licensed as private investigators.21  The American Bar 
Association posits that “[i]nvestigation and expert testimony in 
computer forensics and network testing should be based upon the 
current state of science and technology, best practices in the 
industry, and knowledge, skills, and education of the expert.”22  
And, although most private digital forensics organizations do 
impose a code of ethics as a condition of membership,23 there is 
 
 17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (9th ed. 2009). 
 18. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 508. 
 19. Computer Forensics, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM 3 (2008), 
http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/forensics.pdf.  
 20. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 576. 
 21. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.821–338.823 (2011); TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 
1702.101, 1702.388, 1702.386 (2010); Stephen K. Lubega, Is Your Computer Forensics 
Expert Required to Have a PI License? MYRIAD LITIGATION SOLUTIONS (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.myriadlit.com/newsbyte_v3full.html; John Tredennick, Collecting 
Computer Data in the U.S.: Pick the Wrong State and You Could Wind Up in Jail, L. TECH. 
TODAY, July 2008, at 1–2. 
 22. Whittemore, supra note 14, at 2. 
 23. See, e.g., Code of Ethics, EC-COUNCIL, https://www.eccouncil.org 
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little known about frequency of enforcement, efficacy of 
enforcement, or ethics awareness among the membership.  As one 
court explained: 
 One survey of civil trials estimated that experts 
appear in 86% of the cases with an average of 3.8 experts 
per trial.  While expert witnesses are appearing in civil 
cases in increasing numbers, the topic of expert witness 
ethics and professionalism is largely undeveloped and 
there are few definitive statements about what exactly the 
expert witness’s ethical obligations are and how they are 
to handle the subtle as well as the more blatant attempts 
to influence them. . . . Even where professional 
associations have established ethical guidelines for 
conducting investigations, forming opinions and writing 
reports, very few explain how the ethical boundaries 
imposed on judges and lawyers may bear on the 
performance of their role in the legal system regardless of 
whether they are employed as a retained forensic expert 
for one of the parties or as a court-appointed expert.24 
In contrast, the legal profession is regulated by states’ supreme 
courts, most of which have adopted the ABA model rules.25  And, 
although there has long been criticism of the self-regulation 
model,26 lawyers are generally cognizant of attorney regulation, are 
 
/about_us/code_of_ethics.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Code of Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, INT’L SOC’Y OF FORENSIC COMPUTER EXAMINERS, 
http://www.isfce.com/ethics2.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Code of Ethics and 
Conduct, CYBERSECURITY INST., http://www.cybersecurityinstitute.biz/training 
/ethicsconduct.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Rob Lee, Certification: Ethics, SANS 
COMPUTER FORENSICS, http://computer-forensics11.sans.org 
/certification/ethics (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); HTCIA Bylaws, HIGH TECH. CRIME 
INVESTIGATION ASS’N (2010), http://www.htcia.org/bylaws.shtml; (ICS)2 Code of 
Ethics, (ICS)2, https://www.isc2.org/ethics/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 
2011); New Membership: Code of Ethics, INT’L ASS’N OF COMPUTER INVESTIGATIVE 
SPECIALISTS, http://www.iacis.com/new_membership/code_of_ethics (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2011). 
 24. Kenneth C. v. Delonda R., No. VXXXXXX/02, 2006 WL 47429, at *8 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 4, 2006). 
 25. “The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA 
House of Delegates in 1983. They serve as models for the ethics rules of most 
states.”  ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct: About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/m
odel_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
 26. See, e.g., F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal 
Profession: Is it Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193 (1974); AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL 
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 3 (1970), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
6
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required to take ethics continuing education annually, and most 
were required to pass a course on professional responsibility in law 
school.27 
B. The Lawyer’s Ethical Obligations While Working with Digital Forensics 
Examiners 
Whereas the digital forensics profession is not subject to 
formal ethics standards, the Rules of Professional Conduct may 
nonetheless be implicated by the use of a digital forensics 
examiner.28  Practitioners should be especially mindful of Model 
Rule 5.3, which imposes ethical responsibilities upon lawyers who 
supervise nonlawyers: 
 With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by 
or associated with a lawyer: 
. . . . 
 (b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over 
the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional 
obligations of the lawyer; and  
 (c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such 
a person that would be a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:  
 (1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the 
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or  
 (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable 
 
/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/reports/Clark_Report.authcheckdam.pdf; 2009 ABA 
Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar 
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/survey_lawyer_discipline_syste
ms_2009.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); How Accountable Is the Civil Justice 
System?, HALT, http://www.halt.org/about_halt/press_room/pdf/Full_Media 
_Kit.pdf#Advocacy_by_the_Numbers (last visited Sept. 11, 2011). 
 27. See 2010–2011 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 
INTERPRETATION 302-2 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org 
/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2011_2012_a
ba_standards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf (“The substantial instruction in the 
history, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its 
members required by Standard 302(a)(5) includes instruction in matters such as 
the law of lawyering and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American 
Bar Association.”); Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, NAT’L CONF. OF 
BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited Sept. 
11, 2011) (“The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) . . . is 
required for admission to the bars of all but four U.S. jurisdictions.”). 
 28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1–.2 (2010) (governing the ethical 
responsibilities of both supervisory lawyers and subordinate lawyers). 
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managerial authority in the law firm in which the person 
is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the 
person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action.29 
Although it is improbable that a court would construe Rule 5.3 
to require attorneys to possess the same level of knowledge and skill 
as the digital forensics expert, the rule does impose a significant, 
perhaps underestimated, responsibility.  One court recently ruled 
that lawyers have an affirmative duty to be actively engaged in the 
electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) collection process such that the 
lawyer should meet with the client to physically review the client’s 
data repositories wherever they may be located (including, if 
necessary, personal computers).30  This is not a requirement that 
lawyers be digital forensics experts,31 but rather that lawyers should 
“be active participants in setting [e-discovery] search criteria, 
screening for privileged information, and handling non-technical 
details.”32  If too much autonomy is reposed in experts (or 
technology), a lawyer can lose control of the case, leading to 
increased risk exposure and increased costs.33 
The problem of costs is highlighted by a few recent cases 
concerning fee-related disputes of astonishing amounts that arose 
from seeming miscommunication between the law firm and the 
digital forensics firm.34  Although such costs may be recoverable in 
 
 29. Id. R. 5.3. 
 30. Transcript of Telephone Conference on Discovery Dispute at 12, Roffe v. 
Eagle Rock Energy, L.P., No. 5258-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.iediscovery.com/files/Roffe_v_%20Eagle_Rock.pdf. 
 31. See, e.g., SonoMedica, Inc. v. Mohler, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65714, at *17–
18 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2009) (“Forensic examinations are not a routine part of 
discovery.”). 
 32. Larue, et al., supra note 3, at 13 (citing Jason Krause, Discovery Channels, 
A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 52); see also Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg Materials Corp. of 
Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 220 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that although an IT consultant 
and software programs are crucial to adhering to FED. R. EVID. 502, it is not 
enough to rely upon technology; it is the lawyer’s responsibility to check for 
privileged documents). 
 33. Larue et al. supra, note 3, at 13. 
 34. United States v. Afremov, 611 F.3d 970, 973–74 (8th Cir. 2010) (involving 
a dispute over invoices of a Minnesota computer forensics firm in the amounts of 
$628,737 and $178,850); Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 04-40346, 2008 WL 
474127 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2008) (involving a disputed invoice of a Minnesota 
computer forensics firm in the amount of $94,903); Debra Cassens Weiss, Computer 
Expert Sues Leonard Street Law Firm for $775K, A.B.A. J. (May 21, 2009, 11:11 AM),  
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/computer_expert_sues_leonard_street_
8
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some cases against the non-prevailing party,35 the proactive 
approach to cost containment is for the managing lawyer to define 
and limit the scope of the investigation.  This is because digital 
forensics analysis “takes as much time as the analyst has to give it.”36  
If the case is unusually important or the nature of the evidence 
sought is “not reasonably accessible,”37 an examiner could spend 
several weeks or even months analyzing a single piece of media.38  
“If the case is less important or the nature of the case permits the 
[proponent] . . . to make its case more easily, the investigator may 
spend only a few hours.”39  This cost-benefit analysis has come to be 
known as the “proportionality” doctrine.40  
Cost seems to be the anxiety most often cited concerning 
digital forensics examinations.41  Indeed, “The use of experts is 
 
law_firm_for_775k/ (involving an invoicing dispute of a Minnesota computer 
forensics firm in the approximate amount of $775,000). 
 35. See, e.g., AssociationVoice, Inc. v. AtHomeNet, Inc., No. 10-cv-00109-CMA-
MEH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1654, at *14 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2011) (stating that 
computer forensic investigation costs satisfy the “loss” requirement of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(g) and (c)(4)(A)(i)); 
Sonomedica, Inc. v. Mohler, No. 1:08-cv-230, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65714, at *19 
(E.D. Va. July 28, 2009) (assessing $108,212.15 of monetary sanctions, inclusive of 
digital forensics firm’s fees against contemnors). 
 36. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
544 (2005). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) defines sources that are “reasonably 
accessible” as being so because of “undue burden or cost.” 
 38. Kerr, supra, note 36, at 544. 
 39. Id.  But see Craig Ball, The End of Digital Forensics?, FORENSIC FOCUS: 
ARTICLES/PAPERS (July 23, 2011) (alteration in original), http://articles 
.forensicfocus.com/2011/07/23/the-end-of-digital-forensics/ (discussing the size 
of modern hard-drives where the imaging alone of “multi-terabyte” media is 
“measured in days, not hours”). 
 40. See ONT. E-DISCOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., 10 GUIDING PRINCIPLES TO 
MINIMIZE E-DISCOVERY COSTS A.1 (2010), available at http://www.oba.org/En 
/publicaffairs_en/ediscovery_docs/10Guidingprinciplestominimizee-
discoverycosts-v.2.1.DOC.  The principles show that under the proportionality 
principle, determinant factors include relevance, the cost of production, 
importance of the records, importance of the case, and the amount in controversy.  
Thus, in a “case with a smaller dollar value, a party’s e-discovery obligations should 
be less onerous than in a case with a larger dollar value, or in a case where the 
interests at stake are of greater importance.”  Id.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(C), which requires the court to limit “the frequency or extent of 
discovery” where “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”  Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Tyler Moore, The Economics of Digital Forensics, FIFTH WORKSHOP ON 
THE ECON. OF INFO. SEC., 1 (June 26–28, 2006), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk 
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costly.”42  But another salient consideration is the possibility that 
the conduct of the digital forensics examiner could be imputed to 
the attorney in certain situations under Model Rule 5.3.  Perhaps 
the most common of such conduct is negligence, but the list could 
also include deception because of its popularity and efficacy as an 
investigative technique.43  Deceptive techniques are, however, 
proscribed in the practice of law by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.44  As an example, one state supreme court found that a 
prosecutor who impersonated a public defender in an attempt to 
induce the surrender of a murder suspect had committed an act of 
deception that violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.45  And 
many states, including Minnesota, have held that “[t]here are 
circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent 
of an affirmative misrepresentation.”46 
The question of whether deception, as used in Model Rule 8.4, 
exists in the context of a digital forensics, cloud forensics, or 
network forensics (intrusion detection) investigation is not well 
settled.47  In one Minnesota attorney disciplinary proceeding, the 
 
/users/twm29/weis06-moore.pdf (“It turns out that many of the important 
constraints on digital forensic practices are not technical, but economic.”).  
 42. Paul Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-
Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2004); see also Weiss, 
supra note 34. 
 43. See, e.g., Allan Lengel, Your New Facebook Friend May Be a Federal Agent, 
AOLNEWS (Mar 26, 2010 11:44 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/03/26/your-
new-facebook-friend-may-be-a-federal-agent/; see also Craig Ball, Cross-examination of 
the Computer Forensics Expert, CRAIG D. BALL P.C. (2004), 
http://www.craigball.com/expertcross.pdf (“The world of computer forensics is 
heavily populated by former law enforcement officers from the Secret Service, FBI, 
Treasury, military investigative offices and local police forces.”).  The Supreme 
Court has tacitly approved deception as a valid law enforcement technique in 
investigations and interrogations.  See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) 
(“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception . . . .”); United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) (“Criminal activity is such that stealth and 
strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.”). 
 44. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2009). 
 45. In re Paulter, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002).  Paulter quotes the Oath of 
Admission-Colorado State Bar (2002): “I will employ such means as are consistent 
with Truth and Honor; I will treat all persons whom I encounter through my 
practice of law with fairness, courtesy, respect, and honesty.”  Id. 
 46. In re Zotaley, 546 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. 1996) (quoting MINN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2009)). 
 47. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Muddy Waters: Spyware’s Legal and 
Ethical Implications, GPSOLO MAG., Jan/Feb 2006, available at http://www 
.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_ma
gazine_index/spywarelegalethicalimplications.html (“The legality of spyware is 
murky, at best. The courts have spoken of it only infrequently, so there is precious 
10
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supreme court accepted an attorney’s conditional admission of 
misconduct for violating Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 8.4 after pleading guilty to misdemeanor unauthorized 
computer access by installing and using an e-mail spyware 
program.48  Yet, even if a digital forensics investigator refrains from 
using technology that is unlawful or contains malicious executable 
code, he or she foreseeably could use technology that arguably 
constitutes “deception.”  For example, an investigator may employ 
a “Web bug,” a surreptitious file object commonly used by 
spammers that is placed in an e-mail message or e-mail attachment 
(such as a PDF or Microsoft Word document) to monitor user 
behavior.49  When the user opens the e-mail or attachment, and if 
the user did not preconfigure the e-mail client or program to 
refrain from retrieving images or HTML content from the Internet, 
the e-mail client or program will attempt to retrieve the file object 
from a Web server and, in the process, transmit an HTTP request 
that includes the user’s IP address and other information.50  This 
information becomes available to the sender either through an 
automated report service (e.g., ReadNotify.com) or simply by 
monitoring traffic to the Web server.  In a recent project 
demonstrating a seemingly appropriate use, researchers employed 
such technology in decoy documents to track possible misuse of 
confidential documents.51 
Adopting the view that the foregoing constitutes deception, 
one might also view as deceptive the creation of a decoy Web site 
for the purpose of attracting one or more visitors (perhaps as a 
URL-link contained in an invitation sent via e-mail) and reviewing 
Web traffic logs to collect identifying information and visitor 
browsing patterns and activity (such as in following certain decoy 
links or documents), assuming the visitors were unaware of the 
 
little guidance.”). 
 48. In re Trudeau, 705 N.W.2d 409, 409–10 (Minn. 2005). 
 49. Richard M. Smith, Microsoft Word Documents That “Phone Home” THE 
PRIVACY FOUNDATION (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://web.archive.org/web 
/20001009091304/http://www.privacyfoundation.org/advisories/advWordBugs.h
tml (“A ‘Web bug’ could allow an author to track where a document is being read 
and how often. In addition, the author can watch how a ‘bugged’ document is 
passed from one person to another or from one organization to another.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Brian M. Bowen et al., Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy Documents, 
COLUM. UNIV. DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI., 1 (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.cs.columbia 
.edu/~angelos/Papers/2009/DecoyDocumentsSECCOM09.pdf. 
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site’s true purpose.52 
A few state bar associations have already begun to address 
these technology-related ethical pitfalls. The Philadelphia Bar 
Association Professional Guidance Committee advised in Opinion 
2009-02 that an attorney who asks an agent (such as an 
investigator) to “friend” a party on Facebook in order to obtain 
access to that party’s non-public information, would violate, among 
others, Rule 5.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional 
Conduct.53  Likewise, the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics issued Formal 
Opinion 2010-2, which provides that a lawyer violates, among 
others, New York Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.3, if an 
attorney employs an agent to engage in the deception of 
“friending” a party under false pretenses to obtain evidence from a 
social networking website.54 
And, although Rule 5.3 appears to require scienter (viz. 
“knowledge of the specific conduct”),55 an emerging body of ethics 
opinions concerning information technology appear to be at odds 
with such a requirement.  California’s proposed Formal Opinion 
08-0002 requires a lawyer to evaluate information security and finds 
that “attorneys are faced with an ongoing responsibility of 
 
 52. Nelson & Simek, supra note 47.  The authors characterize spyware as 
“deceptive, at best,” and warn attorneys about running afoul of Rule 1.2 in that “a 
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,” and Rule 8.4 in that: 
[I]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a 
criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law; or (c) engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 
Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 8.4 (2009)). 
 53. Philadelphia Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-2 (2009), 
available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly 
.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf. 
 54. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial 
Ethics, Formal Op. 2010-2 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www2.nycbar.org 
/Publications/reports/show_html.php?rid=1134. 
 55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(1), (2) (2009) (explaining 
that a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if the lawyer orders or, 
with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or the if 
lawyer has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct 
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action). 
12
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evaluating the level of security of technology that has increasingly 
become an indispensable tool in the practice of law.”56  Alabama’s 
Ethics Committee Opinion 2010-02 requires attorneys to exercise 
reasonable care against unauthorized access, which includes 
becoming knowledgeable about a cloud provider’s storage and 
security.57  Arizona’s Ethics Opinion 09-04 provides, in pertinent 
part, that 
[W]hether a particular system provides reasonable 
protective measures must be informed by the technology 
reasonably available at the time to secure data against 
unintentional disclosure.  As technology advances occur, 
lawyers should periodically review security measures in 
place to ensure that they still reasonably protect the 
security and confidentiality of the clients’ documents and 
information.58 
 It is also important that lawyers recognize their own 
competence limitations regarding computer security 
measures and take the necessary time and energy to 
become competent or alternatively consult available 
experts in the field.59 
Likewise, Opinion 842 of the New York State Bar Association 
requires lawyers to “stay abreast of technological advances,”60 and 
Minnesota’s Rule 1.6 requires that  
 A lawyer must act competently to safeguard 
information relating to the representation of a client 
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the 
lawyer or other persons who are participating in the 
representation of the client or who are subject to the 
lawyer’s supervision.61 
 
 56. State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & 
Conduct, Formal Op. Interim No. 08-0002 (2010), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=odIjrEe0wjI%3d&tabid=2167. 
 57. Alabama State Bar, Ethics Op. 2010-02 (2010), available at http://www 
.alabar.org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneId=425. 
 58. State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009), available at http://www 
.myazbar.org/ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=704 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 59. Id. 
 60. New York State Bar, Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 842 (2010), 
available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm 
?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=42697&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm (quoting New York State Bar, Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 
(2004)). 
 61. MINN. RULES PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2005) (emphasis added);  
see also Minnesota Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. No. 22 (2010), available at 
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Another concern regarding lawyer supervision is whether 
lawful data-mining performed by investigators at the behest of 
attorneys outside of the formal discovery process could lead to 
invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, or other tort 
liability.62  A few prominent cases suggest that individuals maintain 
a privacy right in data that can be reconstructed through 
aggregation and inference.63  In United States v. Maynard,64 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, faced with the question of 
whether evidence obtained by police through the warrantless 
search of a GPS device was admissible, concluded that the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of 
his movements, even though he had no expectation of privacy in 
his individual movements exposed to the public.65 
Whereas the sum of one’s movements being entitled to an 
expectation of privacy may seem novel, it is well settled as to the 
sanctity of the home.66  And yet, new technologies will continue to 
test the limits of that expectation, such as a new geo-location 
technique announced by researchers from the University of 
Electronic Science and Technology in China and Northwestern 
University: they claim the ability to locate a target computer on the 
Internet to within 2,250 to 328 feet, a few blocks.67 
 
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/LPRBOpinions/Opinion%2022.pdf. 
 62. See, e.g., Marshall Tanick, The Privacy Paradox, 65 BENCH & BAR MINN. 8 
(Sept., 2008) (discussing privacy and investigative issues, and collecting cases). 
 63. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 
500 (1994) (“An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of 
information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that 
information may be available to the public in some form.”); United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 64. 615 F.3d at 558 (“[The] whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal 
more—than does the sum of its parts.”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 884 (1987) (noting that under the 
Fourth Amendment, it is axiomatic that people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their own homes). 
 67. The researchers used Google Maps to physically locate over 76,000 known 
web servers, and measured the time it takes to send a data packet to a target.  They 
then converted the time to a distance measurement.  Where the target and any of 
the 76,000 web servers shared a common “hop” (a router connection) in the 
transmission, the researchers compared the time difference between the mapped 
Web servers and the common hop, and between the target and common hop.  
After performing multiple repetitive traces, the researchers claimed to locate the 
target computer to within 2,250 to 328 feet, thereby narrowing the location to 
within a few streets.  Their findings were disclosed on April 1, 2011 at the 8th 
Usenix Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation in Boston.  
Yong Wong et al., Towards Street-Level Client-Independent IP Geolocation, USENIX.ORG 
14
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In situations where technological tools or processes not readily 
available to the public are used to reveal the physical location of an 
internet user, it’s not difficult to imagine that a court might look to 
Kyllo v. United States for the proposition that an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated.68  But, if Boring 
v. Google69 is any indication of a trend, tort plaintiffs must establish 
they’ve suffered some greater injury than having their approximate 
physical locations discovered through IP address routing.  In 
Boring, plaintiff property owners filed suit against the internet 
search provider giant alleging, inter alia, invasion of privacy and 
trespass because Google publicly provided digital photographs of 
plaintiffs’ home and property without their authorization.  The 
court found that plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing the 
intrusion was substantial, highly offensive, or transgressed decency 
standards.70 
C. The Digital Forensics Examiner’s Obligations in a Litigation Support 
Role 
As noted above, significant legal and ethical challenges 
confront digital forensics investigators, for which they are ill 
prepared.  Accordingly, the focus of this Comment is not on the 
particular technical qualifications of the expert or methodologies 
necessary to establish admissibility under Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and Daubert and Kumho Tire (or state 
equivalents).71  Indeed, digital forensics is a discipline that is 
inherently inhospitable to pretenders, because it is based upon the 
existence or non-existence of binary data, which ordinarily is 
discernable through proven, industry-standard, repeatable means.  
And: “Where a proffered expert knows himself or herself to be a 
 
(Mar. 06, 2011), http://www.usenix.org/events/nsdi11/tech/full_papers 
/Wang_Yong.pdf. 
 68. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device 
that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ . . . .”). 
 69. 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 362 F. 
App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 70. Id. at 700. 
 71. FED. R. EVID. 702; Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 
(1999) (extending the Daubert standard to all expert testimony); Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that a trial judge is 
the “gatekeeper” of scientific testimony and may admit scientific testimony that is 
not generally accepted so long as the testimony is relevant and reliable). 
15
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quack or otherwise to be offering false testimony, the situation is 
like that of any other witness who is perpetrating a fraud on the 
court.  Such acts are illegal as well as unethical.”72 
It is the legal and ethical issues that warrant further discussion.  
Just as a lawyer may be confounded by technology in dealing with 
digital forensics matters, many (perhaps most) digital forensics 
experts lack formal legal training, and are uninformed about their 
special obligations in the employ of a lawyer.  These obligations 
include zealously guarding the attorney-client privilege, applying 
the work product doctrine, developing reports, exhibits, and 
testimony (that are both admissible and understandable to a lay 
jury or judge), and conducting their work in a way that does not 
compromise the integrity of the case or the rights, privileges, or 
immunities of the retaining party. 
In certain situations, such as where digital forensics examiners 
serve as special masters73 or third-party neutrals,74 they are regarded 
as officers of the court, entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.75  The 
use of a third-party neutral has significant advantages.76  First, as an 
 
 72. Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 49 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 425 (2001). 
 73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (authorizing the court to appoint one who performs 
certain duties consented to by the parties, and hold trial proceedings and make or 
recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided without a jury, if the 
appointment is warranted by (1) some exceptional condition; (2) the need to 
perform accounting or resolve a difficult computation of damage; or (3) the need 
to address pre-trial and post-trial matters that cannot be effectively and timely 
addressed by an available Article III judge or magistrate judge). 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 1 (2009).   
A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, 
conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or 
unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a 
transaction.  Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a 
facilitator, evaluator or decisionmaker depends on the particular process 
that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. 
Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 
1159 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[Investigators reporting to the court are] officers of the 
court [because they are] performing a judicial function at the direction of [the] 
court.”); Ogden v. Ogden, 39 P.3d 513, 516 (Alaska 2001) (“[C]ourt-appointed 
custody investigators are officers of the court and perform quasi-judicial functions 
. . . .”); Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 655 (Colo. 2004) (defining 
“investigators” as officers of the court); Kahre v. Kahre, 916 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Okla. 
1995) (stating that investigators are officers of the court); see also Douglas R. 
Richmond, The Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 
706‒09 (1993). 
 76. See, e.g., Craig Ball, Neutral Examiners, FORENSIC FOCUS, 
http://www.forensicfocus.com/index.php?name=Content&pid=346 (last visited 
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officer of the court, the expert is subject to the court’s inherent 
powers, thereby providing an extra measure of accountability for 
misconduct (e.g., confidentiality breaches).77  Second, a third-party 
neutral is ostensibly impartial, and this impartiality presumptively 
aids in the fact-finding process and administration of justice.  
Third, the third-party neutral is aptly situated to resolve discovery 
disputes, including issues of confidentiality, relevance, and 
privilege, and, if necessary, obtain court intervention or in camera 
review to resolve such disputes. 
If the examiner is not appointed by the court, but rather is 
retained by a party to an adversarial proceeding, he or she is 
nevertheless obliged to ferret out the truth.78  Thus, in Ferron v. 
Search Cactus, LLC,79 a U.S. district court deemed both the 
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s computer experts as officers of the 
court in order to protect the confidentiality of certain ESI found on 
the plaintiff’s computer that was unrelated to the suit. 
1. Work Product Doctrine 
The work product doctrine enhances a lawyer’s ability to 
render competent counsel, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed in 
 
Sept. 11, 2011). 
 77. See Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 738 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that an expert witness is subject to court’s remedial contempt authority); United 
States v. Paccione, 964 F.2d 1269, 1274–75 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A court may bind non-
parties to the terms of an injunction or restraining order to preserve its ability to 
render a judgment in a case over which it has jurisdiction.”). 
 78. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 523 (“Your only agenda should be finding 
the truth, so don’t think in terms of catching somebody or proving something.  It’s 
not your job to win the case.  Don’t become an advocate . . . .”); Sharon D. Nelson 
& John W. Simek, Electronic Evidence: The Ten Commandments, SENSEI ENTERPRISES, 
INC. (2003), http://www.senseient.com/articles/pdf/article18.pdf (“[G]ood 
experts are seekers of truth and will report their findings regardless of what those 
findings may be.”).  Contra Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 882 (Colo. 1987) 
(“As a practical matter, too, an expert hired by defense counsel is likely to feel a 
degree of loyalty to the defendant’s cause.  We need not ascribe this fact to base 
motives on the part of the experts; indeed, the nature of the adversary process, the 
confidentiality surrounding legal representation and professional norms and 
ethics of particular experts all may foster this attitude of loyalty to the 
defendant.”); Christa L. Klopfenstein, Discoverability of Opinion Work Product 
Materials Provided to Testifying Experts, 32 IND. L. REV. 481, 503 (1999) (“Unlike 
other types of trial witnesses, experts are part of a party’s litigation team who, like 
the attorney, are employed expressly for the purpose of analyzing the strengths 
and weaknesses of a party’s case. . . . Experts are not impartial witnesses.  Like 
attorneys, they are paid to advocate a point of view.”). 
 79. No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008). 
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Hickman v. Taylor: 
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing 
parties and their counsel.  Proper preparation of a client’s 
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he 
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, 
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without 
undue and needless interference.80 
It is therefore imperative that both attorneys and examiners 
understand the doctrine and how it applies to digital forensics 
examinations.  Enjoying the privilege of work product immunity is 
one of several reasons the expert should be directly retained by the 
attorney, rather than the attorney’s client.81 
Some practitioners conflate the work product doctrine with 
the attorney-client privilege (discussed below).  Although the work 
product doctrine is broader than the attorney-client privilege, it is 
not a privilege, but rather a limited immunity from production, 
which can be overcome in certain situations.82  The doctrine 
applies in both civil and criminal cases,83 and protects not only 
documents and tangible things prepared by attorneys, but also 
those prepared by an attorney’s “consultant, surety, indemnitor, 
insurer, or agent.”84  In the context of such examinations, the work 
product doctrine also covers the “mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other 
representative concerning the litigation.”85  A prudent expert 
 
 80. 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). 
 81. Other reasons the attorney should maintain the role of “quarterback,” 
and that the expert should have very limited interaction with the client, include: 
preventing an attorney-client relationship from forming between the expert and 
client (if the expert also is an attorney, and the expert is likely to testify); avoiding 
fee disputes from arising between the client and expert; and maintaining the 
scope and strategy of the case.  See infra note 111 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 82. Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 at 510–15 (holding that courts may order 
production of some materials protected by the work product doctrine under 
certain circumstances); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (“[The] materials may 
be discovered if . . . they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and . . . 
the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and 
cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other 
means.”). 
 83. United States v. Nobles, 42 U.S. 225, 236 (1975). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); see also In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire 
Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[The work product doctrine provides] 
a zone of privacy within which to prepare the client’s case and plan strategy, 
18
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should, therefore, take affirmative steps to keep confidential the 
software and hardware used during the examination, as well as his 
or her theories, algorithms, cryptology, notes, tools, processes, 
methods, search queries, resource materials, mental impressions, 
and techniques.  And, because the doctrine may be overcome in 
limited circumstances, attorneys should give careful consideration 
to whether they instruct their experts to memorialize preliminary 
findings in writing, or whether to destroy (or refrain from 
retaining) draft reports.86 
In 2010, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was amended to 
give experts’ draft reports the protection of the work product 
doctrine, exempting them from mandatory disclosure.  The rule 
expressly provides that the doctrine applies to “protect drafts of any 
report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of 
the form in which the draft is recorded.”87  The amended rule also 
applies work product protection to communications between 
experts and the counsel who retain them,88 with three exceptions: 
(1) communications pertaining to the expert’s compensation; (2) 
facts or data that the attorney provided and the expert considered 
in forming opinions; and (3) assumptions that the attorney 
provided and that the expert relied on.89  Critics contend the 
amendment affords attorneys too much latitude in drafting 
 
without undue interference.”); United States v. Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739 (D. N.H. 
1992), aff’d as to issue of work product doctrine, rev’d on other grounds, 29 F.3d 754 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Stanley D. Davis & Thomas D. Beisecker, Discovering Trial Consultant 
Work Product: A New Way to Borrow an Adversary’s Wits?, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 581, 
619 (1994) (“[T]he attorney’s discussions of case theory and the consultant’s 
suggestions thereon should qualify for the higher protection accorded mental 
impressions.”). 
 86. See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 348–49 (“[The forensic tool] also 
produces a case log file, where you can maintain a detailed record of all activities 
during your examination, such as keyword searches and data extractions. . . . At 
times, however, you might not want the log feature turned on.  If you’re following 
a hunch, for example, but aren’t sure the evidence you recover is applicable to the 
investigation, you might not want opposing counsel to see a record of this 
information because he or she could use it to question your methods and perhaps 
discredit your testimony. . . . Look through the evidence first before enabling the 
log feature to record searches.  This approach isn’t meant to conceal evidence; it’s 
a precaution to ensure that your testimony can be used in court.”).  But see Univ. of 
Pittsburgh v. Townsend, No. 3:04-CV-291, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24620 (E.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 30, 2007) (holding that it was improper for the counsel to have 
instructed or otherwise suggested to the experts that all e-mails be destroyed, as 
they became the subject of multiple discovery requests). 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C). 
 89. Id. 
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experts’ reports or influencing their opinions.90  The counter 
argument is that “[t]he risk of an attorney influencing an expert 
witness does not go unchecked in the adversarial system, for the 
reasonableness of an expert opinion can be judged against the 
knowledge of the expert’s field and is always subject to the scrutiny 
of other experts.”91 
One area of particular concern relating to the work product 
doctrine and digital forensics investigations is the applicability of 
the Adam Walsh Act and similar state statutes.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3509(m), added by § 504 of Title V of the Adam Walsh Act, “any 
property or material that constitutes child pornography . . . shall 
remain in the care, custody, and control of either the Government 
or the court.”92  Title V of the Act contains congressional findings 
that: “[e]very instance of viewing images of child pornography 
represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a 
repetition of their abuse”; that “[c]hild pornography constitutes 
prima facie contraband, and as such should not be distributed to, 
or copied by, child pornography defendants or their attorneys”; 
and that “[i]t is imperative to prohibit the reproduction of child 
pornography in criminal cases so as to avoid repeated violation and 
abuse of victims, so long as the government makes reasonable 
accommodations for the inspection, viewing, and examination of 
such material for the purposes of mounting a criminal defense.”93 
“Ample opportunity” and “reasonable access” under the Act 
requires: (1) “the government [to] . . . supply reasonably up-to-date 
tools (hardware and software) and facilities [in order to] . . . 
construct a reasonable, available forensic defense,” (2) “[the ability 
of] a defense expert to utilize his or her hardware or software,” and 
(3) “that the analysis be performed in a situation where attorney-
client privilege and work product will not be easily, accidentally 
exposed to the government, and in a facility which is open to the 
defense at its request during normal working hours, and to the 
extent feasible, during non-working hours.”94  In State v. Boyd,95 the 
 
 90. Robert Ambrogi, Changes to Rule 26 Bring Praise — Albeit Faint, BULLSEYE 
LEGAL BLOG (June 1, 2011), http://www.ims-expertservices.com/blog/2011 
/changes-to-rule-26-brings-praise-albeit-faint.  
 91. Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289, 295–96 (W.D. Mich. 
1995). 
 92. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1) (2006). 
 93. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, §§ 501(2)(D)–(F), 120 Stat. 587, 624 (2006). 
 94. United States v. Flinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
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Supreme Court of Washington held that preparation for trial 
would “likely require revisiting the evidence many times before and 
during trial” and, therefore, where the evidence consists of a 
computer hard drive, “adequate representation requires providing 
a ‘mirror image’ of that hard drive; enabling the defense attorney 
to consult with computer experts who can tell how the evidence 
made its way onto the computer,” and that anything less could 
place an undue burden on defense counsel or a defense expert, 
interfering with a defendant’s constitutional rights.96 
In this examiner’s experience, most government agencies 
endeavor to provide reasonable access, but others, perhaps well-
meaning, have sought to dictate what equipment the defense 
expert may use (including the number of computers, and a 
restriction of both optical read/write drives and solid state drives), 
or have proposed the examiner work in a small room alongside 
state staff,97 or have required the examiner to use state equipment 
to conduct Internet research during the examination,98 or have 
proposed limiting the examiner to a black-and-white printout of 
the forensic report or to an electronic copy on a read/write optical 
device supplied by the state, and have insisted that the work 
product be inspected by a state employee prior to removal from the 
facility.99  The foregoing limitations not only violate the work 
product doctrine, but also implicate a defendant’s right to effective 
 
 95. 158 P.3d 54, 57–62 (Wash. 2007). 
 96. Id. at 60–61. 
 97. See United States v. Winslow, No. 3:07-CR-00072-TMB-DMS, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66855, at *6 (D. Alaska Jan. 28, 2008).  The Winslow court examined 
the lack of privacy caused by placing a government agent inside the room with 
defense experts, such that the experts were not able to have the requisite 
confidentiality needed to talk about the results with other experts and to talk with 
defense counsel about their findings, and also because the agents inside the room 
may be distracting.  “These restrictions impermissibly intrude upon both the 
defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and are insufficient to ‘assure the 
thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case’ allowing for a 
‘fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence.’”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975)). 
 98. See State v. Johnson, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0300, 2010 WL 1424369, at *5 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2010) (“[Defendant] argues that the expert could not access her 
reference materials if required to conduct the exam at the FBI office. . . . [The] 
argument is persuasive.  The State did not proffer a remedy to the expert’s 
inability to access her reference materials at the FBI facility.”). 
 99. See United States v. Bortnick, No. 08-20151-CM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23407, at *9 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2010) (holding that electronic search imposes an 
unreasonable restriction on the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense). 
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counsel and due process,100 and are likely to result in 
relinquishment of the media containing the contraband to the 
defense expert under the Act’s so-called “safety valve.”101 
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and Confidentiality 
The attorney-client privilege is one of the most hallowed tenets 
of American common law.102  The primary function of the privilege 
“is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys 
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in 
the observance of law and administration of justice.”103  Without the 
privilege, which withholds otherwise relevant evidence, “the client 
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult 
to obtain fully informed legal advice.”104  In general, 
communications are protected under the attorney-client privilege if 
(1) a person is seeking legal advice from a lawyer acting in his legal 
capacity, (2) the communication is made for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice, (3) the communication is made in 
confidence, and (4) the communication is made by the client.105  
So, how might this apply to digital forensics examinations? 
[A]s both a legal and practical matter, the defense 
expert’s relationship with the defendant and counsel has 
been protected from intrusions by the state.  The law has 
recognized several doctrines that afford a degree of 
confidentiality to the expert-defense relationship.  Thus, 
statements made to the expert by the defendant and 
counsel may be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.106 
Compare the foregoing pronouncement from one state court with 
 
 100. Sharon Nelson et al., In Defense of the Defense: The Use of Computer Forensics 
in Child Pornography Cases, SENSEI ENTERPRISES, INC. (2009), 
http://www.senseient.com/articles/pdf/In_Defense_of_the_Defense.pdf. 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(2)(B) (2006); see, e.g., State v. Allen, No. E2007-
01018-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114, at *17–19 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Feb. 12, 2009) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3509); United States v. Knellinger, 471 
F. Supp. 2d 640, 650 (E.D. Va. 2007) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3509 as well). 
 102. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 105. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000). 
 106. Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 881 (Colo. 1987). 
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that from another: “Attorney-client privilege is perhaps a 
misnomer, since only the client’s statements enjoy a privilege.  
Communications of the attorney, on the other hand, are not 
privileged, except to the narrow extent to which they reveal 
communications made by the client.”107  Courts may, indeed, 
construe a client’s direct communications to the digital forensics 
expert as privileged, if the expert is regarded an agent of the 
attorney.108  And it is true that an expert is not considered a third-
party whose presence destroys the privilege if the expert’s presence 
is deemed necessary to secure and facilitate communication 
between the client and the attorney (not unlike an interpreter).109  
But it does not appear to this commentator that communications 
between an attorney and an expert should be afforded attorney-
client privilege sui generis, because these are not communications 
made in confidence to an attorney while seeking legal advice.110 
This view notwithstanding, both the expert and the attorney 
would owe a duty to the client—the holder of the privilege—to 
maintain confidentiality.  The attorney’s obligation is detailed in 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in Rules 1.6 (governing 
disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation 
of a client during the lawyer’s representation of the client),111 1.18 
 
 107. Kennedy v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 2010 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 24, at *4 
(Pa. C.P. Feb. 2, 2010). 
 108. Fin. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 961, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 109. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1961); see also In 
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000) (“However, material 
transmitted to accountants may fall under the attorney-client privilege if the 
accountant is acting as an agent of an attorney for the purpose of assisting with the 
provision of legal advice.”); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 143 (8th Cir. 
1972) (“[The] test is whether the [expert’s] services are a necessary aid to the 
rendering of effective legal services to the client.”).  But see United States v. Ackert, 
169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding the privilege is vitiated by the presence 
of third parties who do not translate information from the client to the attorney 
but rather provide information independently to the attorney). 
 110. See Matthew P. Matiasevich, I (Might) Get By With a Little Help from my 
Expert: Expert Witnesses in Trust and Estate Litigation (May 6–7, 2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_property_trust_estat
e/symposia/2011/rpte_symposia_2011_m2903_te_expert_help_litigation.authche
ckdam.pdf.  Matiasevich presented at the 21st Annual Spring Symposia of the ABA 
Section of Real Property, Trust, and Estate Law.  “The attorney-client privilege 
rarely applies to experts for the simple reason that the expert is almost never the 
client and hence communications are not confidential.”  Id.  
 111. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).  Other professionals, 
such as accountants, are governed by similar rules.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 326A.12–
A.13 (2010) (discussing confidential communications, working papers, and 
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(the lawyer’s duties regarding information provided to the lawyer 
by a prospective client),112 and 1.9 (the lawyer’s duty not to reveal 
information relating to the lawyer’s prior representation of a 
former client).113  But the expert, who usually is not present at the 
time of the communication, is also obliged to zealously protect any 
information the expert discovers that implicates communications 
made by the client to his or her attorney. 
Further, this expert obligation may be yet another compelling 
reason why an expert ideally should have legal acumen, because he 
or she needs to correctly recognize and, as necessary, segregate 
attorney-client privileged data.  For example, if the expert 
encounters e-mails between a client and her attorney, which the 
client subsequently forwarded to a friend, will the expert recognize 
a privilege?114  When in doubt, the expert should consider the 
communication privileged and consult with the attorney.  Note this 
exhortation reveals that the integrity of the privilege itself could 
depend upon the integrity of the communication channel between 
the expert and the attorney. 
Attorney-client privilege aside, a competent digital forensics 
expert should also have background and training in information 
security protocols and be able to observe strict confidentiality of all 
data entrusted to him or her: 
Not all cases are shrouded in secrecy, but a fair 
proportion of them are.  There are well known figures 
getting divorced, major companies with proprietary 
information at issue, public figures in the headlines and 
people charged with felonies. . . . During the course of a 
major case where the expert has been identified, the press 
will undoubtedly come sniffing around the expert 
probing for information.  A good expert knows the 
standard answer, ‘I’m sorry, I have no comment’ and is as 
immoveable as the Great Wall of China.115 
 
clients’ records). 
 112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (1983). 
 113. Id. R. 1.9. 
 114. In this example, whether the e-mail is privileged depends on whether the 
jurisdiction recognizes the so-called selective-waiver doctrine.  See Jonathan Feld & 
Blake Mills, The Selective-Waiver Doctrine: Is It Still Alive?, 16 BUSINESS CRIMES 
BULLETIN 4, 4 (Dec. 2008), http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/Publication 
/30990f16-1392-4523-928a-0ffd17e4c01a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment 
/2c7f533d-947f-427c-9773-179747282b76/Feld--Business_Crimes--
Selective_Waiver.pdf (discussing the origins of the selective-waiver doctrine). 
 115. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Finding Wyatt Earp: Your Computer 
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A recent Associated Press article, Anthony Computer Expert Backs Off 
Reported Claims, demonstrates the foregoing point well.116  But, 
because the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to digital 
forensics examiners, the only enforcement mechanisms are 
contractual provisions (i.e., a confidentiality clause in the retainer 
agreement) and “loss of reputation and business.”117  The prudent 
attorney should, therefore, include a confidentiality provision in 
the engagement agreement, which may give rise to a breach of 
contract action if damages are sustained.  Also, if the expert is 
retained while a case is active, either or both parties may move the 
court for a protective order regarding the expert’s handling of 
confidential data, under which the expert would be subject to the 
court’s inherent supervisory powers, including sanctions and 
contempt authority.118 
Finally, cautious practitioners should also consider whether a 
compromise of the client’s data by the expert could be imputed to 
the attorney.  As discussed in an earlier section of this Comment, if 
the attorney knew or had reason to know that the expert would 
breach the attorney-client privilege (or otherwise compromise the 
client’s confidential data), or if the attorney failed to obtain 
adequate assurances that the data would be secure while in the 
expert’s custody, the attorney may be subject to discipline.119 
3. The Expert’s Report 
Whether a digital forensics examiner will likely prepare a 
written report depends on the nature of the case, the examiner’s 
initial impressions, the attorney’s case strategy, and the jurisdiction.  
If the expert plans to testify in federal court and most state courts, a 
written report is mandatory unless otherwise stipulated or ordered 
by the court.120  Although the expert’s identity must be disclosed as 
 
Forensics Expert, SENSEI ENTERPRISES, INC. (2005), http://www.senseient.com 
/articles/pdf/Finding_Wyatt_Earp.pdf. 
 116. Kyle Hightower, Anthony Computer Expert Backs Off Reported Claims, ABC 
NEWS (July 20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=14115919. 
 117. Order Granting Motion to Compel Discovery at 10, State v. Blount, No. 
81-CR-09-1180 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2010) (“The Court does not believe a 
violation of this protective order is likely, as any violation by defense counsel could 
adversely affect the attorney’s license to practice and a violation by [the digital 
forensics expert] could result in loss of reputation and business.”). 
 118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 1 (2009). 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58. 
 120. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(2)(B). 
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part of the initial disclosures, “it is not uncommon for parties to 
agree to a different disclosure date as part of a pre-trial scheduling 
order.121  Sometimes even the disclosure of the expert’s identity is 
pushed off into the future per the scheduling order.”122 
As noted in a prior section of this Comment, Rule 26(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was recently amended to protect 
draft reports from disclosure.123  Prior to the rule amendment, and 
in states that have not adopted similar provisions, it is this 
examiner’s experience that the standard practice has been to 
refrain from memorializing initial impressions in the form of notes 
or draft reports until the examiner and attorney have taken the 
opportunity to confer.  If the examiner’s preliminary findings and 
impressions appear to be unhelpful to the attorney’s theory of the 
case, the attorney will usually halt further analysis and not call the 
expert to testify.  Likewise, if the examiner is using a tool that 
includes case logging, such as earlier versions of AccessData FTK, 
enabled by default, the examiner should be instructed as to when 
and whether to disable it.124 
And although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to 
discuss the structure of the expert’s report and all that it should 
contain, a few words should be said about what the report should 
not contain. The report should not be tailored to support a 
particular outcome, as a material omission may constitute fraud.125  
Examiners must resist overtures by attorneys, however well-
intended or abstract, to submit any testimony or work product that 
is disrespectful of the truth, including overstating, understating, or 
omitting findings.  The findings, however, should be concise and 
carefully circumscribed.  The report should not volunteer an 
overabundance of information, which may be vulnerable to 
scrutiny under cross-examination.126  Further, all findings should be 
 
 121. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(2)(A) (requiring that witnesses intended to be used at 
trial who will present evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705 
(the specific rules that apply to expert testimony) be disclosed in the initial witness 
disclosure required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)). 
 122. Bruce A. Olson, Preparing an Expert Report, DIGITAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATOR 
NEWS, 1 (July 13, 2011), http://www.dfinews.com/article/preparing-expert-report. 
 123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)–(C). 
 124. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 125. Fraud is defined as “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or 
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009). 
 126. See Olson, supra note 122, at 3 (“Avoid volunteering information that is 
not specifically relevant.  You are writing a report, not a thesis.  If you volunteer 
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accurately qualified as to the limitations of the particular tool(s) 
used, the applicability of the current technology and industry 
standard best practices,127 the methodology or techniques (such as 
search criteria or formulae), and the scope of the investigation.  
The scope of the investigation is not only limited by relevancy, but 
also by budget (i.e., time),128 which almost always places legitimate 
and significant constraints on what data is found or not found, and 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
Data not found has an important, often overlooked, place in 
the report and may be as important (or more important) than what 
was found.  When an examiner, through experience and 
information generally accepted in the profession, expects to find 
certain metadata (such as a browser internet history) or data to 
which extant metadata refers—but does not find this metadata or 
data—it should be so noted (also subject to the qualifications more 
fully discussed hereinabove).  The absence of this metadata or data, 
whether in allocated (not deleted) or unallocated (deleted but 
recoverable) areas of the media, must be attributed to automated 
or manual processes, if possible.  The examiner and attorney must 
then confer to determine whether the absence is the result of 
inadvertent spoliation, such as a defragmentation utility or 
metadata removal tool used for legitimate data privacy purposes, or 
intentional spoliation by the user. 
D. Legality of Digital Forensics Investigation Techniques 
Another important factor for consideration by both attorneys 
and examiners in digital forensics investigations is the legality of 
investigation techniques.  Consider, for example, whether an 
attorney or the examiner may take possession of a computer 
 
too much, all you are doing is providing the opposing attorney with ammunition 
to use in cross examination.”). 
 127. For example, at the time of this writing, there is some debate between 
experts and vendors as to the methods for reliably recovering data from Microsoft 
Windows 7 “shadow volumes.” The best practice, therefore, may evolve as the 
technology is better understood, if Microsoft alters the technology through 
patches, or if third-party products are able to alter or disable the feature. 
 128. See Kerr, supra note 36; see also NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 517 (“The . 
. . attorney . . . should define the investigation’s goal or mission.  All reports to the 
[attorney] should start by stating this mission or goal, which is usually to find 
information on a specific subject, recover certain important documents, or recover 
certain types of files or files with specific dates and times.  Clearly defining the 
goals reduces the time and cost of the examination and is especially important 
with the increasing size of hard drives and networks.”). 
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belonging to a husband but seized by a wife in preparation for 
marital dissolution proceedings.  If a court finds that the wife did 
not have equal dominion over the computer (e.g., if the computer, 
or some portion thereof, was password-protected by the husband or 
belonged to the husband’s employer), the taking of the computer 
for analysis might constitute a crime.129  Likewise, evidence 
obtained from a keylogger or spyware deployed by the client or 
examiner may violate state or federal law (e.g., the Stored 
Communications Act).130 
Also, certain types of “cyber sleuthing” or penetration testing 
may be unlawful under various state and federal statutes.  For 
example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, last amended in 
2008, criminalizes anyone who commits, attempts to commit, or 
conspires to commit an offense under the Act.131  Offenses include 
knowingly accessing without authorization a protected computer 
(for delineated purposes) or intentionally accessing a computer 
without authorization (for separately delineated purposes).  
Practitioners should be aware that various statutory phrases, such as 
“without authorization” and “access,” have been the continuing 
subject of appellate review.132 
Yet another area of legality concerns recently enacted laws in 
some states requiring digital forensics examiners to be licensed as 
private investigators.  Texas passed such a law that provides for up 
to one year imprisonment and a $14,000 fine for persons 
 
 129. See Moore v. Moore, No. 350446/07, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5221, at *1 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2008) (holding that a wife seeking a divorce could use 
evidence she found on a computer taken from husband’s car just before she 
petitioned for marital dissolution because the computer was a family computer—
not a work computer as alleged by husband—the taking occurred before the 
commencement of the dissolution case, and husband’s car was considered the 
family car).  See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.89, 609.891 (2010) (proscribing 
unauthorized computer access and theft). 
 130. Sean L. Harrington, Why Divorce Lawyers Should Get Up to Speed on 
CyberCrime Law, MSBA COMPUTER & TECH. L. SEC. (Mar. 24, 2010, 9:40 PM), 
http://mntech.typepad.com/msba/2010/03/why-divorce-lawyers-should-get-up-
to-speed-on-cybercrime-law.html (collecting cases regarding unauthorized 
computer access). 
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 132. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1996) (affirming the trial 
court’s holding that the state did not prove the defendant committed a crime); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in 
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1624–42 (2003) (showing how and 
why courts have construed unauthorized access statutes in an overly broad manner 
that threatens to criminalize a surprising range of innocuous conduct involving 
computers). 
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conducting unlicensed computer investigations.133  The attorney 
employing a non-licensed expert may also commit a criminal 
offense.134  And Michigan’s new law makes unlicensed digital 
forensics work a felony punishable by up to four years 
imprisonment, damages, and a $5,000 fine.135  In 2008, North 
Carolina’s Private Protective Services Board proposed to amend 
General Statute Section 74C-3 to include “Digital Forensic 
Examiner” among the roles that must be licensed by the state.136  
The measure was defeated.137  Meanwhile, the American Bar 
Association has discouraged such legislation, observing, 
“[c]omputer forensic assignments often require handling data in 
multiple jurisdictions.  For example, data may need to [be] imaged 
 
 133. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.104 (2011); see also Private Security Bureau 
Opinion Summaries: Computer Forensics, TEXAS DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 4–5 (Aug. 21, 
2007), http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/psb/docs/psb_opin_sum.pdf.  The Opinion 
clarifies that the Act applies to computer forensics, defined as: 
[T]he analysis of computer-based data, particularly hidden, temporary, 
deleted, protected or encrypted files, for the purpose of discovering 
information related (generally) to the causes of events or the conduct of 
persons.  We would distinguish such a content-based analysis from the 
mere scanning, retrieval and reproduction of data associated with 
electronic discovery or litigation support services. 
Id. at 4. 
 134. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.386 (2011); see also Joseph L. Lanza, Should 
Your Next Expert Witness Be a Licensed Private Investigator?, 68 TEX. B.J. 118, 124 
(2005) (discussing the Texas law, what it means to attorneys, who is exempt, and 
potential problems that may arise). 
 135. 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 67. 
 136. Mack Sperling, North Carolina May Require Licensing for Computer Forensic 
Consultants, but Do We Need It?, NORTH CALOLINA BUS. LITIG. REP. (Sept. 24, 2008), 
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/2008/09/articles/discovery-1/north-
carolina-may-require-licensing-for-computer-forensic-consultants-but-do-we-need-
it/ (reporting on proposed legislation and providing a draft at 
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/uploads/file/Forensics%20Legislatio
n.pdf). 
 137. S. 584, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009), available at 
http://ncleg.net/Sessions/2009/FiscalNotes/Senate/PDF/SFN0584v3.pdf. 
  [The Bill] [a]mends GS 74C-3(b) to exempt from the definition 
of private protective services a person engaged in (1) computer or digital 
forensic services or the acquisition, review, or analysis of digital or 
computer-based information, whether for the purposes of obtaining or 
furnishing information for evidentiary or other purposes, or for 
providing expert testimony before a court, or (2) network or system 
vulnerability testing, including network scans and risk assessment and 
analysis of computers connected to a network. 
Id. at 1; see also North Carolina Statutes, LAWS.COM STATUTES, 
http://statutes.laws.com/north-carolina/Chapter_74C/GS_74C-3 (exempting 
digital forensic examiners) (last visited Sept. 9, 2011). 
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from hard drives in New York, Texas and Michigan.  Does the 
person performing that work need to have licenses in all three 
states?”138  The ABA Report concluded: 
 The public and courts will be negatively impacted if 
e-discovery, forensic investigations, network testing, and 
other computer services can be performed only by 
licensed private investigators because not all licensed 
private investigators are qualified to perform computer 
forensic services and many qualified computer forensic 
professionals would be excluded because they are not 
licensed.139 
Indeed, very few licensed private investigators are qualified to 
perform computer forensics services.  At present, this commentator 
observes that the trend seems to be leading away from state 
licensing requirements and therefore is not likely to present a 
problem for most litigators seeking to retain digital forensic 
examiners. 
Undoubtedly, one of the thorniest legal problems facing 
litigators and examiners is that of child pornography 
(“contraband”) encountered in digital forensics investigations.140  
As discussed in a prior section of this Comment,141 federal law 
prohibits the knowing production, receipt, shipment, distribution, 
reproduction, sale, or possession of any “visual depiction 
involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct,” or of “any other material that contains an image of child 
pornography.”142  Violations are punishable by a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment for five years and up to twenty 
years,143 except for mere possession, which is punishable for up to 
ten years.144  Further, Congress, in enacting the Adam Walsh Act of 
2006, reasoned that child pornography as prima facie contraband 
 
 138. Whittemore, supra note 14, at 14. 
 139. Id. at 2. 
 140. See generally BERYL HOWELL, DIGITAL CONTRABAND: FINDING CHILD PORN IN 





 141. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(4)(C); Ambrogi, supra note 90. 
 142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a), 2252A (a) (2006). 
 143. Id. §§ 1466A(a)(2)(B), 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1). 
 144. Id. §§ 1466A(b)(2)(B), 2252(b)(2), 2252A(b)(2). 
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should not be distributed to or copied by defendants, their 
attorneys, or experts.145  Therefore, an expert who encounters 
contraband during an investigation outside of a law enforcement 
facility must cease work and contact law enforcement to come to 
the place of the investigation to seize the contraband.146  An expert 
or attorney who e-mails or delivers the contraband may be 
prosecuted for copying or distribution.147 
It should be noted that § 3509(m) does not apply to state 
criminal proceedings; it expressly governs the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.148  Although no Minnesota appellate court has 
yet ruled on the issue, a Minnesota district court, relying on the 
reasoning from appellate courts in Tennessee and Missouri, ruled 
that it does not apply to Minnesota state courts.149  The court found 
that the State did provide reasonable access but, in light of the 
added costs of conducting the examination at law enforcement 
facilities (“approximately doubling the cost”)150 and severe funding 
cuts to the State Public Defender’s Office, “[i]t would not be in the 
interests of the Public Defender’s Office and the criminal justice 
system in general to have the Public Defender’s Office 
unnecessarily expend additional funds to acquire the necessary 
forensic examination.”151  Accordingly, the court ordered a forensic 
copy be provided to the defense expert under a protective order, 
 
 145. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. § 
501(2)(E) (2006). 
 146. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 176 (“The evidence must be turned over 
to law enforcement.  This material is contraband and must not be stored by any 
person or organization other than a law enforcement agency.”). 
 147. United States v. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739 (D.S.D. 2010) (indicting 
an attorney—who claimed he was doing research for a potential client by 
investigating the existence of child pornography on a P2P network—for possession 
and distribution of child pornography); see also State v. Brady, No. 2005–A–0085, 
2007 WL 1113969, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2007) (recounting that—
notwithstanding a state court protective order—the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation executed a search warrant on court-appointed defense expert’s 
residence, the Bureau seized his computer and media, and the Government 
threatened an indictment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A), rev’d on other grounds, 
894 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio 2008).  
 148. Commonwealth v. Ruddock, No. 08–1439, 2009 WL 3400927, at *1 (Mass. 
Supp. Oct. 16, 2009); State ex rel. Tuller v. Crawford, 211 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007); Allen v. Tennessee, No. E2007-01018-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 348555, at 
*6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2009). 
 149. See State v. Blount, No. 81-CR-09-1180, slip op. at 6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 
2010). 
 150. Id. at 7 n.2. 
 151. Id. at 9. 
31
Harrington: Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag-Team
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
 
384 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
which the court found would adequately serve the purpose of the 
Adam Walsh Act “to protect children from sexual exploitation and 
to prevent child abuse and child pornography.”152  Notwithstanding 
the inapplicability of the Act to state court criminal proceedings, 
and notwithstanding state court protective orders, the Government 
has nevertheless prosecuted defense attorneys and experts for 
contraband acquired in the performance of their official duties.153  
At least one federal district court has ruled that an attorney acting 
in accordance with the state’s immunity statute may assert the 
operation of the statute as an affirmative defense.154 
Arguably, there is merit to the argument that an expert should 
have access to the evidence in his or her own lab, because of the 
increased costs and inefficiencies of conducting the analysis at law 
enforcement facilities.155  But, a useful analogy when considering 
whether a defense attorney should take possession of child 
pornography is that, in a drug possession case, the prosecutor does 
not keep samples of a controlled substance in the case files, and 
instead must inspect the evidence under controlled conditions 
where it is kept at the law enforcement facility. 
E. Civil Liability Arising from Digital Forensics Investigation 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss 
comprehensively the civil liabilities that could arise from digital 
forensics investigations, certain examples are more obvious than 
others.  Under the Adam Walsh Act, any party that is “aggrieved” by 
the distribution of child pornography (an activity that could be 
undertaken by a careless, albeit well-intentioned, forensic 
 
 152. Id. at 10; see also Commonwealth v. Ruddock, No. 08–1439, 2009 WL 
3400927, at *3 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009) (issuing protective order to prevent 
“unnecessary disclosure”). 
 153. United States v. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d 737, 743 (D.S.D 2010); State v. 
Brady, 894 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ohio 2008).  
 154. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 743. 
 155. See Nelson et al., supra note 100 (“The beleaguered defense expert is 
forced, often by economics, to do whatever it is possible to do in one or two eight 
hour days. Frequently, the expert has to fight to use his/her own equipment and 
to work in privacy.”); see also State v. Blount, No. 81-CR-09-1180, slip op. at 6 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2010) (crediting expert’s testimony that conducting the 
examination at law enforcement facilities would approximately double the cost); 
United States v. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640, 647–48 (E.D. Va. 2007) 
(crediting testimony that conducting examination at law enforcement facilities 
would exacerbate costs). 
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investigator) may bring a civil action for damages.156  Another 
example is invasion of privacy tort liability or civil liability under the 
Stored Communications Act resulting from accessing an e-mail 
account or computer without authorization.157  And yet another 
example is the possibility that an attorney who retains a careless or 
incompetent expert could be liable for negligence.158  In one 
recent case, the incompetence of one party’s computer expert led 
the court to find the party’s actions to be “grossly negligent, if not 
reckless,” and issued an adverse jury instruction.159  In another, 
when the court queried the expert whether a potential discovery 
problem could not be overcome by examining the “metadata,” the 
expert made no response, prompting the court to observe that it 
created “the firm impression that he was not familiar with a term 
that we would expect a computer expert to know.”160 
F.  Prosecutor’s Interactions with Digital Forensics Examiners 
Prosecutors have a few unique issues to contend with in digital 
forensics investigations.  One is the perception or allegation of 
“shopping” for an expert, or reckless use of a tainted expert, which 
may constitute a violation of defendant’s due process rights161 and 
may also be a violation of Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (special responsibilities of a prosecutor).162  
The following interview excerpt from The Right to Expert Assistance in 
 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(f) (2006). 
 157. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07–11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6–7 (E.D. 
Mich. Feb. 6, 2008). 
 158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 411, 413 (1965). 
 159. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 379 (D. Conn. 2007).  
 160. In re Search of 3817 W. W. End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 
2004). 
 161. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 807 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 
424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that reckless use of highly suspicious false 
testimony violates due process); see also Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, 
Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1506 (2007) 
(“Some of the most disturbing revelations that emerged from the DNA 
exonerations that occurred in the 1990s concern the misconduct of prosecutors. . . 
. [A] significant contributor to these miscarriages of justice was the misuse of 
expert testimony. . . . The reckless use of a tainted expert should be considered a 
due process violation.”). 
 162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010).  But cf. Bennett L. 
Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 17, 39 
(2003) (“Personal sanctions against a prosecutor for deliberate misconduct, such 
as civil liability and professional discipline, almost never happens.”). 
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a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World,163 illustrates this problem: 
 Because two police crime laboratories would not 
declare a positive bootprint match in the infamous 
Rolando Cruz prosecution, prosecutors sought out a third 
expert, Dr. Louise Robbins, who declared a match.  A 
detective, who resigned because he believed the wrong 
people had been charged, later observed:  
 “The first lab guy says it’s not the boot. . . . We don’t 
like that answer, so there’s no paper [report].  We go to a 
second guy who used to do our lab.  He says yes.  So we 
write a report on Mr. Yes.  Then Louise Robbins arrives.  
This is the boot, she says.  That’ll be $ 10,000.  So now we 
have evidence.”164 
Another less frequent issue may arise when a digital forensics 
examiner encounters evidence during a non-criminal investigation 
and reports the findings to law enforcement.  If law enforcement 
fails to obtain a warrant on probable cause to seize the media but 
instead gives directives to the examiner to search for additional 
corroborating evidence, the examiner may be regarded as 
“deputized.”  As an agent of the state, the examiner’s search—
absent a valid warrant exception—may be in violation of the 
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights from unreasonable searches, 
and any evidence procured therefrom may be inadmissible.165 
III. DIGITAL FORENSICS MAY FACILITATE ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 
Applying the so-called “Kovel Principle,”166 where the court 
analogized an accountant to a translator whose presence would not 
destroy privilege as if the lawyer was meeting with a client who did 
not speak English, a digital forensic expert certainly facilitates a 
lawyer’s ability to provide competent counsel.  Just as technical 
accounting concepts important to a representation may be like a 
foreign language to the lawyer or the client, so too may the 
technical concepts in a digital forensics context important to a 
representation. 
Indeed, preceding sections of this Comment have called 
attention to ethical traps for the unwary when attorneys retain 
digital forensics experts, but the decision not to retain a digital 
 
 163. 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305. 
 164. Id. at 1308–09. 
 165. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12. 
 166. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).  
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forensic expert at the appropriate time and for the appropriate 
reasons also implicates ethical considerations, including Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 and 1.3.167  Federal Magistrate 
Judge John Facciola, during his keynote speech at LegalTech New 
York in 2009, cited numerous examples of attorney incompetence 
regarding information technology and e-discovery, recalling one 
example from a child pornography case, where a defense attorney 
reasoned, “You know Judge, I just don’t understand this computer 
stuff.”168  The magistrate concluded the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights had been compromised, and he said, “I can’t 
think of a more obvious example of how ineffective the assistance 
of counsel [was].”169  Another august commentator listed “lawyer 
incompetence,” at the top of his recent article, Ten Things that 
Trouble Judges about E-Discovery.170 
Yet, expert incompetence has the same effect as attorney 
incompetence on the outcome of cases and may compound the 
problems by creating malpractice liability for the well-intentioned 
attorney who retained the expert.  Therefore, attorneys must 
strategically select experts who are able to assure authenticity, 
traceability, repeatability, data integrity, and confidentiality, all of 
which ultimately leads to admissibility.171  Moreover, an expert, 
unburdened by the duty of advocacy, should be able to articulate 
under cross-examination the protocols and procedures that led to 
 
 167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009).  Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to 
provide “competent representation,” which is defined as “the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 
Likewise, Rule 1.3 requires that a lawyer “shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  See also Saks, supra note 72, at 431.  “If there 
is scientific evidence that would help a party’s claim or defense, counsel ought to 
find out about it and offer it.  Failure to do so is a failure to provide competent 
representation.”  Id.  (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 
(“Thoroughness and Preparation . . . includes inquiry into and analysis of the 
factual . . . elements of the problem.”)). 
 168. Interview by Karl Schieneman with Judge John Facciola, U.S. Magistrate 
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., and Tom French, Solo Practitioner, (Mar. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.esibytes.com/?p=371. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Craig Ball, Ten Things that Trouble Judges About E-Discovery, CRAIG D. BALL, 
P.C., 1 (2010), http://www.craigball.com/TenTroublesEDD.pdf. 
 171. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. 
Md. 2007) (“[C]onsidering the significant costs associated with discovery of ESI, it 
makes little sense to go to all the bother and expense to get electronic information 
only to have it excluded from evidence or rejected from consideration during 
summary judgment because the proponent cannot lay a sufficient foundation to 
get it admitted.”). 
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the findings in such a way that—in theory—can be repeated by 
another similarly situated expert under the substantially similar 
conditions, and lead to a substantially similar result. 
The decision of when to retain such an expert is less difficult.  
The first steps in digital forensics work, according to the Palmer 
definition, are “preservation, collection, validation, [and] 
identification.”172  For the lawyer dealing with a potential client or 
evaluating an adversary’s case, the first of these steps should instead 
be identification, then preservation and collection.173  
Identification is done preferably with the aid of an expert 
knowledgeable about probable sources of evidence,174 but—
depending on the fact scenario—is not always necessary.  
Preservation, depending on the circumstances and the attorney’s 
knowledge of potential sources of data, may be initiated by little 
more than a litigation hold memorandum175 or an instruction to a 
client to cease using a computer after the duty to preserve has 
attached.176  In one case frequently cited at e-discovery seminars, 
the U.S. Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the 
failure to issue a written litigation hold notice automatically 
constitutes gross negligence, “even if it results from a pure heart 
and an empty head.”177  In more complex scenarios, even where the 
potential sources of data are known, an expert is needed to 
 
 172. Palmer, supra note 16, at 16. 
 173. EDRM Stages Explanation, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL,  
http://www.edrm.net/resources/edrm-stages-explanation (last visited Sept. 5, 
2011). 
 174. Jason Krause, Discovery Channels, 88 A.B.A. J. 4, 51 (2002). 
 175. A “litigation hold,” or “legal hold,” is defined by The Sedona Conference 
Glossary as: 
[A] communication issued as a result of current or reasonably 
anticipated litigation, audit, government investigation or other such 
matter that suspends the normal disposition or processing of records.  
Legal holds may encompass procedures affecting data that is accessible as 
well as data that is not reasonably accessible.  The specific 
communication to business or IT organizations may also be called a 
“hold,” “preservation order,” “suspension order,” “freeze notice,” “hold 
order,” or “hold notice.” 
See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 32. 
 176. The obligation to preserve evidence when a party “reasonably anticipates 
litigation” is “well established.”  Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan 
v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  “Once a party 
reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ . . . .”  Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 177. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
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establish how preservation should be accomplished (e.g., disabling 
automated defragmentation on workstations in an enterprise, 
disabling backup processes that overwrite older data, etc.), so that 
the later collection effort will be fruitful.  Conversely, self-collection 
risks include under-collection, spoliation, changes to metadata, 
chain-of-custody challenges, and authentication.178 
To avoid self-collection risks, many fact scenarios—even minor 
tasks, such as forensically capturing a web page179—warrant 
retaining a digital forensics expert, unless the costs clearly outweigh 
by the benefits.  The decision to forgo an expert can lead to 
missing important evidence recoverable only by a forensics expert, 
alteration of the ESI or metadata, inability to establish a chain of 
custody,180 or criminal prosecution.181  This examiner participated 
in one case where the entirety of the inculpatory ESI, which led to a 
prompt settlement of the case, was located in “unallocated” areas of 
the hard drive (i.e., deleted files), and which was recoverable only 
with the use of specialized tools. 
Finally, because lawyers must recognize their own competence 
limitations regarding information technology, and take the 
necessary time and energy to become competent or, alternatively, 
 
 178. Leonard Deutchman, Steer Clear of the Perils of Self Collection, LAW.COM (Apr. 
16, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005508773&slreturn=1& 
hbxlogin=1 (discussing the various risks of self-collection and ways to avoid them). 
 179. Mark Kerzner, Technology for Lawyers and Paralegals: Evidence 
Authentication—Web Site Content, SHMSOFT BLOG (Sept. 1, 2008), http:// 
shmsoft.blogspot.com/2008/09/technology-for-lawyers-and-paralegals.html (“If an 
item of evidence can be easily forged by a lay person, a developer, or a hacker, it is 
inherently inadmissible, because it may not be what it purports to be.”); William R. 
Wohlsifer, Internet Content Authentication, 1 E-COM. 10 (2001), available at 
http://www.wohlsifer.com/publications.html (“Third-party authentication services 
help overcome multiple objections to admissibility and always increase the weight 
of the proffered evidence.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-372, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20353, at *19–20 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011).  Defendants were assessed substantial 
sanctions for “self-collection,” where the defendant employee solely responsible 
for searching for and collecting relevant documents issued no litigation hold, 
conducted no keyword searches for e-mail, and made no effort to communicate 
with defendant’s IT department about how to electronically search documents.  Id. 
at *26–27. 
 181. United States v. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d 737, 737 (D.S.D. 2010) (indicting 
defendant for possession of child pornography because defendant decided to 
undergo research in child pornography because one of his clients was accused of 
pedophilia); see also Michelle Lore, Prosecution Serves as Warning, WISC. L.J. (Feb. 1, 
2011, 11:48 AM), http://wislawjournal.com/2011/02/01/prosecution-serves-as-
warning/ (“[Flynn may] stifle the availability of representation for people 
confronting child pornography charges.”). 
37
Harrington: Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag-Team
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
 
390 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
consult experts in the field,182 the failure to do so may result in a 
rule violation.  Yet another risk of attorney self-collection is that of 
the attorney becoming a fact witness, in violation of Rule 3.7, where 
the attorney may be required to testify as to the collection, 
preservation, and authenticity of ESI.  Moreover, to the extent that 
the attorney’s testimony in authenticating evidence implicates 
communication with the client, it may endanger the attorney-client 
privilege. 
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING CLOUD COMPUTING 
AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Technologies affecting digital forensics investigations have 
come and gone over the years.  These include varying operating 
systems, mobile devices, data storage size, data storage formats and 
architectures, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and Internet-based 
communications. Some of these changes have even given rise to 
predictions of “[t]he end of digital forensics.”183  Nevertheless, the 
core technological principles of observation, repeatability, 
traceability, and integrity have remained intact.  Likewise, the legal, 
professional, and ethical obligations of confidentiality and fiduciary 
duties, as more fully discussed ante, have evolved relatively slowly.  
But two recent, exploding trends are pushing technological and 
ethical boundaries and necessitating novel approaches like never 
before. 
The first of these is so-called “cloud computing.”  The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) defines cloud 
computing as a “model for enabling convenient, ondemand [sic] 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources [(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services)] that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”184  
The U.S. Government Accountability Office defines cloud 
computing as “an emerging form of computing where users have 
 
 182. See State Bar of Arizona, supra note 58. 
 183. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 39; see also Graeme B. Bell & Richard Boddington, 
Solid State Drives: The Beginning of the End for Current Practice in Digital Forensic 
Recovery?, 5 J. DIGITAL FORENSICS, SEC., & L. 3 (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.jdfsl.org/subscriptions/JDFSL-V5N3-Bell.pdf (discussing that solid-
state drives may destroy evidence without one telling them to do so). 
 184. The NIST Cloud Computing Project, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,  
 http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/states/maryland/posters/cloud-computing.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
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access to scalable, on-demand capabilities that are provided 
through Internet-based technologies, . . . [with] the potential to 
provide information technology services more quickly and at a 
lower cost, but also to introduce information security risks.”185  
Multiple cloud computing surveys reveal that, although some 
enterprises remain apprehensive about entrusting their data to the 
cloud, those that have already done so plan to increase their 
presence.186 
Contrary to popular conception, cloud computing is not new.  
Anyone who has used Hotmail since the 1990s was using cloud 
computing.  But it is novel as a widespread IT service delivery 
system for corporate enterprises: 
 Cloud computing allows businesses and individuals to 
use the Internet to access software programs, applications, 
and data from computer data centers managed by [third-
party] providers . . . .  Cloud computing services are not a 
unitary product but rather a continuum of services which 
businesses are able to access on an as-needed basis.  These 
services range from “public cloud” services—that is, pre-
packaged standard services—to “private cloud” services—
that is, highly individualized services designed specifically 
for a single client.187 
 
 185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-855T, INFORMATION SECURITY: 
GOVERNMENTWIDE GUIDANCE NEEDED TO ASSIST AGENCIES IN IMPLEMENTING CLOUD 
COMPUTING, 2 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10855t.pdf. 
 186. 2011 CIO Agenda Findings, GARTNER, 
http://www.gartner.com/technology/cio/cioagenda_findings.jsp (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2011) (stating that although IT budget projects will remain flat in 2011, 
almost half of all CIOs expect to operate their applications and infrastructures via 
cloud technologies within the next five years); Dennis Drogseth, The Road to the 
Responsible Cloud, ENTERPRISE MGMT. ASSOCIATES (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.enterprisemanagement.com/web/ema_ac0211.php (discussing that 
companies can achieve the “Responsible Cloud” by using a step-by-step approach); 
see also Dennis Drogseth, How to Make the Most of Cloud Computing without Sacrificing 
Control, ENTERPRISE MGMT. ASSOCIATES, 3 (Sept. 27, 2010), 
http://www.businessandleadership.com/download/fs/doc/reports/howtom-
1.PDF (“In general, the survey respondents were strongly positive about Cloud-
computing related benefits, with 76% of those in deployment claiming real or 
measurable financial benefits from Cloud.”); Press Release, Microsoft News 
Center, Digital Infrastructure, Cloud Computing Transforming Fragmented 
Manufacturing Industry Value Chain, According to Microsoft Study, (Apr. 4, 
2011), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2011/apr11 
/04-03mscloudfragmentspr.mspx (“‘The survey shows . . . a growing number of 
forward-looking companies are exploring new and innovative business capabilities 
uniquely delivered through the cloud’ . . . .”). 
 187. IBM Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at 
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Not only is cloud computing novel as a corporate IT service 
delivery system, but the hardware used, which consists of virtualized 
data centers,188 is also radically different today than even ten years 
ago.  Consequently, traditional computer forensics approaches are 
likely to be stymied by both the data storage architecture and the 
data delivery infrastructure.189 
We no longer have the ability to physically acquire objects 
in these virtual environments where disks, memory, and 
networks are shared, and traditional ownership 
boundaries are blurred.   
 To date, there has been very little research done on 
the current state of the tools, processes, and 
methodologies to obtain legally defensible digital 
evidence in the cloud.190 
In addition, other constraints have been identified by 
commentators: the geographically disparate locations of the data 
(often implicating multiple jurisdictions, some outside of the 
United States),191 and time.192  These developments are troubling, 
 
*15–16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (citation omitted). 
 188. Aled Edwards et al., Diverter: A New Approach to Networking Within Virtualized 
Infrastructures, 109–10 (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://conferences.sigcomm 
.org/sigcomm/2009/workshops/wren/papers/p103.pdf. 
 189. John J. Barbara, Cloud Computing: Another Digital Forensic Challenge, 
FORENSIC MAG. 2, http://www.forensicmag.com/article/cloud-computing-another-
digital-forensic-challenge (last visited Sept. 8, 2011) (“Further forensic issues 
concern the potential effect the cloud services could have on the digital data itself 
and how the forensic examiner can explain, in a creditable manner, all these real 
and potential indiscretions to the court.  Many forensic examiners recognize that 
‘there is no foolproof, universal method for extracting evidence in an admissible 
fashion from cloud-based applications, and in some cases, very little evidence is 
available to extract.’”) (quoting Andrew D. Frowen, Cloud Computing and Computer 
Forensics, INTAFORENSICS (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.intaforensics.com/Blog 
/Cloud-Computing-And-Computer-Forensics.aspx); Bernd Grobauer & Thomas 
Schreck, Towards Incident Handling in the Cloud: Challenges and Approaches, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 ACM CLOUD COMPUTING SEC. WORKSHOP (2010); 
Stephen D. Wolthusen, Overcast: Forensic Discovery in Cloud Environments, in FIFTH 
INT’L CONF, ON IT SECURITY INCIDENT MGMT. & IT FORENSICS, Sept. 15–17, 2009.  
But see Dan Morrill, Cloud Computing Making Forensics Easier, CLOUDAVE (Sept. 22, 
2008), http://www.cloudave.com/2887/cloud-computing-making-forensics- 
easier/.  Morrill contends that cloud computing makes forensics “easier” because, 
when a party is served with a preservation letter, he or she can “easily backup [the] 
environment and put it onto the cloud for the investigators to use, while the 
normal course of business happens.”  Id. 
 190. Scott Zimmerman & Dominick Glavach, Cyber Forensics in the Cloud, 14 
IANEWSLETTER 4, 5 (2011), http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/Vol14_No1.pdf. 
 191. Id. at 6; see also Cloud Computing & National Security Law, HARVARD NAT’L 
SEC. RES. GROUP, 8 (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/students 
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because, as one commentator observed, “The cloud is now used to 
store many of the same materials as a briefcase or backpack.  Cloud 
computing has added an ‘anywhere-access’ function to Internet 
usage which provides a reasonable justification for storing private 
materials in the cloud.”193  In other words, data that has 
traditionally been subject to forensic investigation is now being 
rendered inaccessible in relative, practical terms. 
At the time of this writing, this commentator believes data that 
is recoverable only through digital forensics tools and practices, but 
which may be in the custody of third-party cloud providers, is not 
“reasonably accessible” as that phrase is used in Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(2)(B).194  First, third-party cloud 
providers would likely mount an obstreperous campaign against 
any intrusion by digital forensics examiners into their proprietary 
data warehousing.  Second, the likelihood of retrieving residual 
data from voluminous, distributed, virtualized, and shared storage 
area networks seems remote at best,195 and might be further 
frustrated by an inhospitable third-party content provider (even if 
the collection was authorized by court order).  Third, the costs of 
attempting to forensically retrieve residual data from a cloud-
 
/orgs/nsrc/Cloud.pdf. 
 192. Zimmerman & Glavach, supra note 190, at 6 (“Once the information 
source is identified, do all involved entities have time synchronized via a consistent 
time source such as Network Timing Protocol (NTP)?  If a forensic expert has a 
difficult time convincing your legal counsel that the time stamps from client-side 
log files match time stamps on provider-side log files, the forensics will be difficult 
to defend.”). 
 193. David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment 
Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 
2223 (2009) (citing Benjamin J. Romano, New Computing Strategy Sends Microsoft to 
Clouds, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at A10). 
 194. The rule states that “[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically 
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(B)(2)(B); see also 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION, at ii (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_
607.pdf (“Absent a showing of special need and relevance, a responding party 
should not be required to preserve, review, or produce deleted, shadowed, 
fragmented, or  residual electronically stored information.”). 
 195. Zimmerman & Glavach, supra note 190, at 6 (“There may only be traces of 
a virtual machine (VM) because the VM may reside on dispersed, internationally 
located physical drives; data may have been deleted from a striped multi-disk array 
unit; or forensics may reside within another cloud vendor storage system that 
involves court orders to retrieve.”). 
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computing content provider’s system (which costs are a matter of 
rank speculation at this time) would doubtless serve as a deterrent 
to most requesting parties or, alternatively, to a court applying the 
proportionality doctrine.196  Consequently, data recovery 
concerning cloud computing content providers is likely to be 
limited to warrants and administrative subpoenas for the near 
future. 
Just as some commentators urge, “Cloud computing is ‘as 
important as the Web was 15 years ago,’”197 others observe, “The 
world has embraced social networking with a fervor rarely seen.”198  
And so, the second of new technologies requiring special 
consideration addressed by this Comment is social media.  Social 
media is familiar to many readers: the American Bar Association 
reported in 2010 that fifty-six percent of lawyers surveyed 
maintained a presence in an online social network, such as 
LinkedIn, Facebook, or Legal OnRamp, compared with just fifteen 
percent in its 2008 survey.199 
The methods of data recovery arising from social networking 
are widely varied.  Discovery of social networking sites “requires the 
application of basic discovery principles in a novel context,” 
because of the need to “define appropriately broad limits . . . on 
the discoverability of social communications.”200  Because much of 
the data is stored in the cloud, the same challenges discussed above 
apply to social media data collection.  In addition, the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) may create another hurdle, 
requiring the user (often, the producing party), rather than the 
service provider, to consent.201  With certain enumerated 
 
 196. See Kerr, supra note 36. 
 197. Grant Gross, Cloud Computing May Draw Government Action, INFOWORLD 
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/cloud-computing-
may-draw-government-action-825 (quoting Mike Nelson, visiting professor for the 
Center for Communication, Culture and Technology at Georgetown University 
and a former tech policy advisor for U.S. President Bill Clinton, speaking at a 
Google forum on the policy implications of hosted applications and services). 
 198. Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 REGENT 
U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2010). 
 199. For a discussion of the American Bar Association’s report, see Robert 
Ambrogi, ABA Technology Survey on Social Networking (Jul. 22, 2010), ROBERT 
AMBROGI’S LAWSITES, http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2010/07/aba-technology-
survey-on-social-networking.html. 
 200. EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 
2010). 
 201. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Facebook, MySpace, and Media 
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exceptions, the SCA prohibits an electronic communications 
services (“ECS”) provider from knowingly divulging to any person 
or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic 
storage by that service.202  With regard to Webmail and private 
messaging, these forms of communications are protected by the 
SCA, but with regard to Facebook “wall postings” and MySpace 
comments, they may not be protected if the user’s privacy settings 
allowed unrestricted access.203 
Nevertheless, by the time digital forensics investigators get 
involved, it’s usually because the producing party could not or 
would not produce data as obligated.  And so, the good news for 
litigators is that recovery from the service provider (either through 
subpoena or forensic residual data recovery from the providers’ 
servers) is usually not necessary, as the data is likely available from 
more accessible sources, especially mobile devices.  Users of social 
media need to use computers or mobile devices to access these 
services and, therefore, the traces of that use are likely recoverable 
using traditional digital forensics techniques from these computers 
and mobile devices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Expert witnesses have become an indispensible fixture to pre-
trial practice and procedure, as well as to jury trials.  The 
prevalence of ESI on personal computers, servers, mobile devices, 
and the cloud, has significantly increased the need for competent 
digital forensics experts in the roles of intrusion prevention, 
incident response, and the preservation, collection, analysis, and 
presentation of ESI in litigation.  To make effective use of a digital 
forensic expert, and to manage the risks of ethical, civil, or criminal 
liability, attorneys must carefully supervise the expert without 
overstepping professional boundaries.  Further, digital forensic 
experts benefit from having a robust legal background in order to 
be of greater efficacy in their service to the bench and bar, but 
should remain faithful to the vocation of neutral fact-finding.  By 
adhering to an adaptive framework of both separation-of-duties and 
 
Temple are ECS providers for the purposes of the SCA). 
 202. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(b) (2006). 
 203. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.  But see Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 
N.Y.S.2d 650, 656–57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  The court held that a user has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy “notwithstanding her privacy settings” because 
Facebook and MySpace did not guarantee “complete privacy.”  Id. 
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industry standard best practices, lawyers and digital forensics 
experts will be well-suited to work effectively together, and to meet 
the evidentiary challenges imposed by rapidly evolving technology. 
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